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I. INTRODUCTION
Even the most strident opponents of regulation cannot fathom a world
in which society does not-at some level-regulate the provision or
consumption of information or communications. Even if markets function
perfectly, we would still envision certain legal controls. A useful example
*Russ Taylor is an attorney who researches communications law at the University of
Oxford's Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, Programme in Comparative Media Law and
Policy. The Author holds a B.A. and a J.D. from George Mason University and an M.Sc. in
Media and Communications Regulation from the London School of Economics. In 2003, he
cofounded OfcomWatch (www.ofcomwatch.co.uk), a Web site devoted to reviewing and
commenting on media and communications policy issues affecting the United Kingdom and
Europe.
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of one such legal control is the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
which establishes firm boundaries on the government's ability to control
information. Other forms of regulation may include the creation of a legal
liability scheme if information is abused in some manner, such as libellous
statements, copyright infringement, or identity theft. The absence of some
form of regulation is unthinkable.
But as a society, we have gone much further in our attempt to regulate
information than merely enacting prohibitions on certain government or
private actions. Our federal, state, and local policymakers have created
extensive regulatory structures that govern everything from the provision of
cable and telecommunications services using public rights of way, satellite
and wireless services that involve a high degree of international
coordination or standardization, and various media services, with both
positive and negative content regulation. Providers of media and
communications services are licensed, subsidized, monitored, and
sanctioned to specify just a few of the most commonly employed
regulatory techniques. The problems and opportunities for which we see a
regulatory role seem endless.
At the center of all this stands the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC"), a so-called independent federal regulatory agency
that is composed of five commissioners, appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate, not more than three of which are from the same
political party.' The FCC is independent in the sense that, while it is
subject to laws passed by Congress and court decisions, most of its actions
cannot be directly overruled by the President through the administrative
process. The FCC has an extensive array of responsibilities and obligations,
a large budget and staff, and a prominent place in the heart of policymaking
on media, technology, and communications. Further, because the FCC
regulates several multibillion dollar industries that touch almost every
aspect of our economic and social lives, its structure, remit, and activities
are often subjected to severe scrutiny.
But some argue that having the FCC stand at the center of all this
policymaking is the wrong approach. They make a compelling case in
many respects. Why should five unelected officials establish forward-
looking policies that govern media and communications in our republic?
Would it not be better to remove the bureaucratic mystery surrounding
policymaking and have these sometimes contentious issues resolved by the
President or persons answering directly to the President? The President is
accountable directly to the American public and is often regarded as a swift
decision maker. If there is controversy, what better focal point than the
1. 47 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
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President? It is in this intellectual climate that the Administrative Law
Review recently published Randolph May's essay on opportunities for
reform of the FCC.
2
While this Article functions as a reply to May's essay, I salute May's
many contributions to an important debate, namely, how best to structure
society's control over the creation, distribution, and consumption of
information. May's contributions are commendable as an initial matter for
their very existence and nature. We should not regard our policymaking
and regulatory structures as strictly bound by the idealist but perhaps
unworkable principles of the past. If conditions change or our learning
changes to such an extent that we believe a new regulatory structure is
called for, then we should not hesitate to call for change. May does this.
My aim in this Article is to expand on May's recent call for
consideration of FCC reforms, criticize his methodology to some extent,
3
and briefly present a framework within which reform of the FCC or any
regulatory agency or organization can be evaluated. But my most important
aim in this Article is to convey the following: Any discussion about reform
of an agency with the size, importance, and history of the FCC should be
based, in part, on empirical data about how regulators work, not anecdotal
information that simply confirms our existing assumptions. Just as
carefully as we scrutinize the regulator, we should also carefully scrutinize
our own assumptions about regulatory structures and the regulatory process,
and the empirical or logical methods by which we test those assumptions.
II. RANDOLPH MAY'S CALL FOR AGENCY REFORM
May offers two principal suggestions for reform of the FCC. He
suggests (1) reducing the number of FCC commissioners from five to three
2. Randolph J. May, Recent Developments in Administrative Law: The FCC's
Tumultuous Year 2003: An Essay on an Opportunity for Institutional Agency Reform, 56
ADmiN. L. REv. 1307 (2004).
3. An important disclaimer is in order: May's essay does not generally claim to
employ social science or similar investigatory techniques. Therefore, my criticism of May's
approach is somewhat overstated-but purposely so. May asks for a debate and attempts to
frame that debate by describing what he believes is an outdated regulatory structure and by
drawing inferences from real-world situations he observes. Since his call for reform is based
on a certain context established in his essay, it is appropriate to examine whether that
context withstands careful scrutiny.
4. This Article tracks the claims contained in May's essay, which primarily calls for
reform based on the need for more timely and coherent policies. This Article does not focus
on doctrinal issues such as the questionable constitutional status of independent regulatory
agencies or normative preferences about regulation or governance. In essence, this Article
ignores the issues associated with agency reform and focuses exclusively on what one might
call the effectiveness issue raised by May: Are there structural changes that, if implemented,
would make the FCC more effective in accomplishing its mission?
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or even one and (2) moving the FCC into the executive branch of
government and removing its independent status.5 As justifications for his
reform proposals, May argues that "with a five-member agency, it is more
likely that, as a result of compromises made in reaching a majority
decision, the resulting order will lack clarity or even be internally
contradictory. ' 6  He also argues, "Along with increased political
accountability, presidential supervision should lead to decisions that are
timelier, more internally coherent, and generally more consistent with other
executive branch initiatives.
' 7
When I first read May's essay, I reacted quite strongly to these
claims. This is not because I am an uncritical institutional supporter of the
FCC or someone who otherwise fears change. My reaction is based
primarily on what I perceive to be unexplored assumptions about regulation
or governance of complex systems generally. My concern is not that we are
too critical of issues surrounding agency reform. Instead, my concern is
that we are not thinking critically enough about regulatory structures and
processes. I will share my concerns and address them in this Article.
III. EXPLORING THE NEED FOR AGENCY REFORM
As an initial matter we should explore whether, as May claims,
conditions are ripe for reform of the FCC. May's argument that it is time
to consider reform of the FCC stems from two assertions: (1) during the
tumultuous year of 2003, the FCC poorly handled two important policy
issues before it, and (2) convergence and rapid change significantly altered
the marketplace environment. 9 1 shall address each rationale in turn.
First, with respect to the year 2003, I agree with May that the FCC's
consideration of the two policy issues he discusses' 0 was marked by
5. May, supra note 2, at 1321.
6. Id. (citation omitted).
7. Id. at 1323 (citation omitted).
8. Id. at 1307-08.
9. Id. at 1309.
10. Those were the Triennial Review and the media ownership proceedings. For the
Triennial Review, see Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent
Local Exchange Carriers, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
18 F.C.C.R. 16978 (2003) [hereinafter Triennial Order], corrected by Errata, 18 F.C.C.R.
19220 (2003), affd in part and rev'd in part, U.S. Telecom Assoc. v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (reversing major portions of the FCC's Triennial Order), cert. denied, 543
U.S. 925 (2004). For the media ownership proceedings, see 2002 Biennial Regulatory
Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules
Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report and Order
and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 13620 (2003), aff'd in part and remanded
in part, Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004) (remanding the
FCC's cross-media ownership limits decisions for justification or modification), cert.
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squabbling, delay, and generally poor policymaking. Otherwise, I will not
generally explore or critique May's description of those two FCC
proceedings. However, subject to my earlier disclaimer, a broader,
methodological critique surfaces: Are those two proceedings representative
of the business before the agency during this time? Are they' representative
of a systematic agency pathology that requires a cure? Here, I part
company with May because the evidence appears anecdotal and highly
subjective. 12
Again, consistent with my initial disclaimer, we must realize that May
is simply exploring opportunities for reform, albeit in a suggestive manner.
But the criticism remains: Precisely why do the two selected proceedings,
in May's words, "provide the opportunity and impetus" for considering
reform of the FCC? 3 Why are they, again in May's words, "important for
what [they say] about the functioning of the agency"? 14 In making these
claims, we should first address the significant potential logical frailty in
using two proceedings, from one year, out of the seventy years of the
agency's existence and thousands of proceedings during that time. The two
proceedings at issue may indeed say something larger about the structure of
the FCC. Alternatively, they may simply describe those two proceedings
denied, 125 S.Ct. 2904 (2005).
11. Could it be possible that an agency with the particular reformed structure and
characteristics advocated by May would have experienced a similarly tumultuous year in
2003? What would that tell us about structural reform? May claims that a bad 2003 for the
FCC "increased the sense" that the regulatory regime needs updating, but before we discuss
changing the FCC's structure, should we not first conduct a rigorous empirical analysis of
the links between agency structure and policy outcomes? May, supra note 2, at 1309. May
suggests that the FCC's structure contributes to poor outcomes. Id. However, we must be
careful when alleging causation, particularly when there may be other confounding factors
(e.g., confusing legislation) that could be the real cause of the poor policymaking outcomes.
12. While the two proceedings selected by May as examples of the FCC's poor track
record were certainly important and controversial, there were many- other important
proceedings and activities before the FCC in 2003, including the DTV transition, public
safety communications issues, and the World Radio Conference, to name but a few. See
generally FCC ANNUAL PROGRAM PERFORMANCE REPORT (2003), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Reports/ar2003.pdf [hereinafter 2003 FCC REPort].
13. May, supra note 2, at 1309.
14. ld. at 1313.
15. Certainly, there are many reasons for adopting this viewpoint. Study of an unusual
or atypical case can teach us much about a larger issue. For example, the two proceedings at
issue were quite large in terms of their social and economic impact on society. One might
argue that, if the FCC fails in such important cases, it does not matter what the outcomes are
in average cases. These two examples might serve as what Stake calls an "instrumental case
study"-a study of the particular that offers insight into a larger phenomenon. ROBERT E.
STAKE, THE ART OF CASE STUDY RESEARCH 3 (1995).
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as statistical outliers, atypical of the agency's performance during 200316
and thus offer very little insight to those concerned with agency reform.
In any event, if we are to focus on one particular year, why not start
with the FCC's critical assessment of its own performance during that
year? Admittedly, an agency's self-appraisals will suffer from several
problems such as insularity and bias. However, while painting a rather
dismal portrait of an incompetent or unresponsive agency, May makes no
mention of the FCC's annual self-appraisal reports ("Reports"), issued
every year by the FCC and available to the public on its Web site.17 The
Reports track FCC performance in certain key areas such as spectrum,
competition, homeland security, and modernization of internal practices.
The Reports are exhaustive and specify data that illuminate the issues May
addresses in his essay. For example, May criticizes the FCC for
extraordinary delays in one particular rulemaking proceeding (a six-month
delay), 18 but the FCC claims that, in Fiscal Year ("FY") 2003, the average
time period between adoption of a decision and that decision's release to
the public was a mere ten days. 19 The delay increased to fifteen days in FY
2004.20 So, we are left with two accounts of the FCC's timeliness: May's
qualitative account of the time delays associated with one or two
particularly large and important proceedings, and the FCC's more
quantitative account of its average speed of disposal of matters before it.
Both accounts inform the debate. But calls for reform cannot be taken
seriously unless they deal with both the illustrative and qualitative type of
account and the exhaustive and quantitative type of account.
Not only does May criticize the FCC's timeliness in two proceedings,
he also suggests that its decision-making ability is correlated with its
number of commissioners, claiming that "it is more likely that, as a result
of compromises made in reaching a majority decision, the resulting order
will lack clarity or even be internally contradictory." 2' But May provides
no further reasoning or data to support his otherwise contestable claim.
Contrast the recent empirical studies that address this precise issue. For
example, in one recent study, researchers compared the effectiveness of a
16. A related methodological question: Why is the year 2003 representative?
Longitudinal studies of the FCC's practices would likely offer a more realistic picture of
how the agency's structure affects policy outcomes. This is particularly true because we are
considering wholesale changes in the FCC's structure and not merely focusing on the
introduction of a new regulatory technique or process.
17. See, e.g., 2003 FCC REPORT, supra note 12.
18. May, supra note 2, at 1314.
19. See 2003 FCC REPort, supra note 12, at 30.
20. See FCC ANNUAL PROGRAM PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP. 67 (2004),
available at http://www.fcc.gov/Reports/ar2003.pdf.
21. May, supra note 2, at 1321 (citation omitted).
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five-member committee versus individual decision making on monetary
policy issues. The study found that groups make better decisions than
individuals.
22
Even if one were to discard potentially unrealistic laboratory-style
empirical work and simply focus on reported actual outcomes and
comparisons, there is no evidence to suggest that multimember
commissions perform worse than executive branch agencies. If one
considers a reviewing court's rate-of-reversal of agency actions a proper
measure of the quality of regulatory actions, then there exists ample data
upon which to review real world outcomes. The answers from a 1992
review are not terribly surprising: (1) federal agencies tend to do well in
court generally and (2) "there [is] no substantial difference.., between the
executive and independent agencies."
2 3
I am not endorsing a particular viewpoint on whether the FCC would
make better and timelier decisions if it was managed by one chairperson
instead of a five-member commission. More study and consideration are
clearly needed. I also suspect the answer would be highly contextual,
depending on the precise nature of the issue in question and the affected
parties. But one thing is certain, the concept of "less is more" in the context
22. Claire Lombardelli, James Proudman & James Talbot, Committees Versus
Individuals: An Experimental Analysis of Monetary Policy Decision-making (Bank of
England, Working Paper No. 165, 2002), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=340560. The
Bank of England study also follows earlier empirical work which undercuts the notion that
individuals make decisions in a timelier manner than groups. See Alan S. Blinder & John
Morgan, Are Two Heads Better Than One?: An Experimental Analysis of Group vs.
Individual Decisionmaking (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7909,
2000), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=242143. But see David Schkade, Cass R.
Sunstein & Daniel Kahneman, Are Juries Less Erratic than Individuals?: Deliberation,
Polarization, and Punitive Damages (Univ. of Chicago Law School, John M. Olin Law &
Econ. Working Paper No. 81, 1999), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=177368
(indicating that juries make more unpredictable and varied decisions than individuals when
it comes to damage awards). Unlike juries, the Bank of England study employed
economically-literate students from the London School of Economics in a policy
environment, a setting more similar to the communications-literate FCC commissioners.
23. See Martha Anne Humphries & Donald R. Songer, Law and Politics in Judicial
Oversight of Federal Administrative Agencies, 61 J. POL. 207, 210 (1999) (citation omitted)
(describing a 1992 study covering federal agencies before U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal for
1979, 1983, and 1987). Of course, we must be careful when we say that any statistic
measures the quality of decision making. There could be factors other than the intellectual
quality of an agency decision that result in success or failure in court. For example, federal
agencies may have more litigation resources than private litigants. Also, as Humphries and
Songer demonstrate, federal judges may let their own policy preferences influence their
decisions. Id. Similarly, many provisions of federal law provide deference to administrative
agencies' decisions. Finally, there may be procedural reasons (e.g., the doctrine of standing)
why the quality of federal agency decisions are not tested at all.
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of agency decision making has not been demonstrated with any degree of
persuasiveness.
With respect to May's second rationale for reform-the current fast-
changing state of the marketplace-nothing about this particular era of
convergence and change warrants FCC reform in its own right. It is only
the notion that the agency is out-of-step and unable to cope with the
changed marketplace that would support the contention that reform is
needed. But here again, I part company with those who claim that an
agency born of New Deal thinking about problem solving is poorly suited
to tackle problems in today's environment. At the very least, I look for
more evidence.
I find a high degree of generational exceptionalism in May's
description of the FCC as a once "sleepy backwater government agency"
now confronting a new climate of "rapid technological change .
propelled by the digital revolution" in which there are "rapid-fire business
successes and failures" and resulting "breakdown of existing regulatory
service distinctions.' 24 While there are obviously changes afoot, they do
not appear to be happening in such a rapid manner that the FCC cannot
keep pace. There existed a similar environment of exceptionalism when
then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover addressed the regulation of
radio in 1924, ten years before the FCC was created:
There are certain minimum regulatory powers in the Department of
Commerce. They are inadequate to meet the shifting situation that this
developing art constantly presents. Nor could any legislation keep pace
with the changes imposed by scientific discovery and invention now
going on in radio.... With the development of the art this problem has
become one of the most complex technical character ever presented to
the Government for solution. At every succeeding conference we have
had more and more difficult problems to solve, and those which we
present today are of a complexity greater than ever before.2
5
But are these descriptions of change and complexity, renewed every
generation it seems, really that authentic?26 We must all fall victim to this
24. May, supra note 2, at 1307-09.
25. Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce, Address Before the Third National Radio
Conference: Recommendations for Regulation of Radio (Oct. 6, 1924), available at
http://earlyradiohistory.us/1924conf.htm.
26. Karl Popper wrote of this tendency, criticizing those scholars:
Contrasting their "dynamic" thinking with the "static" thinking of all previous
generations, [and believing] that their own advance has been made possible by the
fact that we are now "living in a revolution" which has so much accelerated the
speed of our development that social change can be now directly experienced
within a single lifetime. This story is, of course, sheer mythology.
KARL RAIMUND POPPER, THE POVERTY OF HiSTORICISM 160 (2nd ed. 1960).
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type of thinking at times-the thinking that ours is a unique age that
requires new ideas and new structures for solving problems.
May also paints a portrait of the FCC and similar regulators as being
born out of a flawed understanding of dispassionate regulatory expertise.
He makes a very good point: we should not expect regulators to be
insulated from the political process. But we cannot let our thinking about
the silly ways that certain early regulators conceived themselves as
dispassionate administrative scientists be equally as singular. Surely, the
FCC possesses expertise in numerous areas covered by its statutory remit.
Moreover, much of the FCC's work is accomplished in a nonpolitical
environment and in a neutral manner. In other words, it was wrong during
the New Deal era to place sheer faith in the concept of administrative
science, just as it is wrong today to think there is no science to
administration. So, while we should perhaps be interested in studying the
use of "electioneering-style tactics" before the FCC,27 we must also
analyze how often and in what particular contexts those tactics are
employed.
May takes dead aim at James Landis as the leading proponent of
unrealistic thinking about the capabilities of the administrative state.28 But
Landis was more critical in his thinking about regulation than May credits
him for. Landis was often severely critical of regulatory agencies. For
example, in a report to President-elect Kennedy in 1960, Landis completely
savaged the FCC, claiming that it "drifted, vacillated and stalled in almost
,29every major area.' '  Sounding almost like an earlier version of May,
Landis further noted that the FCC "seems incapable of policy planning, of
disposing within a reasonable period of time the business before it, of
fashioning procedures that are effective to deal with its problems." Landis
even advocated structural reforms remarkably similar to those advanced by
May, calling on policymakers to increase the power of chairmen over
collegial bodies and making those chairmen directly accountable to the
President. 3 1 In fact, in his influential work on regulation, Justice Stephen
Breyer noted that such structural approaches to agency reform (e.g., calls
for single agency heads accountable to the President) are commonly
advanced, and he cited similar reform proposals that go back as far as
27. May, supra note 2, at 1317.
28. Id. at 1313.
29. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86th Cong., REPORT ON REGULATORY
AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 53 (Comm. Print 1960) (James M. Landis, primary
author).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 65.
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1937.32 Justice Breyer said of such proposals, "The major weaknesses in
these and other similar proposals for structural change, however, is that
they are designed to be policy neutral. They assume that improved agency
structure will automatically bring about improved performance. Yet there is
little evidence that this is so."
33
Further, the FCC may have been born during the New Deal era, but
the agency that exists today is in numerous structural, procedural, and
cultural ways not a New Deal agency. Since its birth, the FCC has, among
other things, (1) had its structure changed in 1983 from seven
commissioners to the present five,34 (2) had its remit expanded, such as the
addition of satellite communications in 1962, (3) been subjected to new
legal constraints such as the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") of
1946, 36 (4) seen the intellectual climate surrounding the field of regulation
shift remarkably due to the influence of the "Chica o school" in developing
the public choice theory of economic regulation, Nand (5) been subject to
more aggressive Presidential and Congressional oversight since the Reagan
era. 38 And, of course, one cannot discount all the internal changes-some
minor, some not so minor-that have occurred over the past seventy years.
We should appreciate the significant differences from the agency that
James Landis and Justice Felix Frankfurter would have recognized.
3
May suggests that a regulator residing within a political branch of
government is more accountable than an independent regulatory agency.
He argues that "locating the FCC in the executive branch would introduce
more political accountability for policymaking determinations." 4  But
precisely why does housing certain FCC policymaking functions in the
executive branch increase accountability? The argument appears, on the
surface, to be logical. One could imagine that, because the President is the
only federal official voted on by all members of the electorate, his
32. Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform 354 (1982).
33. Id. at 356.
34. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-253, 96 Stat. 805
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2000)).
35. See Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 47 U.S.C. § 701 (2000).
36. See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2000).
37. Maxwell L. Steams, Restoring Positive Law And Economics: Introduction To
Public Choice Theme Issue, 6 GEo. MASON L. REv. 709, 720 (1998) ("[T]he earliest and
perhaps most notable Chicago School contribution to public choice was to recast business
regulation from an 'imposed upon' to an 'acquired' model.").
38. See James F. Blumstein, Regulatory Review By The Executive Office Of The
President: An Overview And Policy Analysis Of Current Issues, 51 DuKE L.J. 851, 858-60
(2001) (describing the far-reaching Reagan-era initiative that centralized presidential
oversight of regulatory policy-making).
39. May, supra note 2, at 1312 (providing the perspective of J. Frankfurter).
40. Id. at 1322.
[Vol. 58
REFORM OF THE FCC
decisions on media and communications policy matters would be subject to
great scrutiny by the press and public.
The concept of accountability stems from what concerns people and
how those in power see themselves bound to address those concerns. So,
how can we test May's claim? How can we judge whether an executive
branch agency would be more accountable than an independent agency?
And to whom would the agency be accountable? Do members of the public
even realize that the FCC is today not directly controlled by the President?
Does the public already mistakenly hold the President accountable for the
actions of the FCC?4 1 There are no polls of which I am aware that track
popular beliefs about the independent nature of the FCC; although recent
poll data suggest that a majority of the public ignores even the most heated
media regulation debates. 2 So many questions remain unanswered that I
cannot predict with confidence whether increased executive control over
FCC policymaking would increase accountability.
We also must consider the follow-on effects, which may include
further, not less, politicization of, and chaos in, the regulatory structures.
As a prominent critic of presidential control over the regulatory process,
Cynthia Farina points out:
The new presidentialism arms the President to insist that he, uniquely,
possesses the constitutional prerogative, democratic mandate, and
managerial competence to direct the administrative state. These claims
of singular entitlement and ability to control the regulatory agenda
establish a norm of confrontation, rather than collaboration. By raising
the stakes for other actors in the system, such hegemonistic claims may
trigger an oversight arms race. Indeed, many would say that this is
exactly what happened in the 1980s, as Congress reacted to what it
perceived as aggressive unilateral White House deregulatory initiatives
41. It is this notion of an "accountability mismatch" that Mariana Prado innovated and
conceptually explores in her recent paper. Prado notes that "the President can play with the
electorate's perception. He may simply claim responsibility for popular policies and blame
agencies for unpopular policies." Mariana Mota Prado, Independent Regulatory Agencies
and the Electoral Accountability of the President 11 (2004) (paper prepared for the SELA
Conference, June 12, 2004) (citation omitted), http://islandia.law.yale.edu/sela/SELA%
202004/MotaPradoPaperEnglishSELA2004.pdf.
42. Seventy-two percent of poll participants in July 2003 indicated that they had heard
"nothing at all" about the FCC's media ownership proceeding. Twenty-three percent had
heard "a little." Press Release, Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Strong
Opposition to Media Cross-Ownership Emerges (July 13, 2003), http://people-
press.org/reports/print.php3?PageID-721. The number of people aware of the proceeding
seems quite low and supports May's hypothesis that elevating media policy matters to the
presidential level might increase public awareness and accountability. However, when
contrasted with the polling status of executive branch departments on similar issues, the
FCC might not fare so poorly. In other words, it is the comparative standing of the
independent versus executive agencies we should be interested in, not simply the low
standing of the independent regulatory agencies.
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with a variety of equally aggressive countermeasures.... If we
encourage political actors to regard regulatory oversight as a battle for
the soul of the administrative state, we may be unpleasantly surprised
at the weapons each turns out to have available in its arsenal. 
4 3
I do not necessarily endorse Farina's viewpoint, but her observation
hits the proper methodological tone. The regulatory environment-that
space or arena in which debates occur and decisions are taken-is not
static. A legal shift of control over the FCC's policymaking functions to the
executive branch would be followed by countershifts and not just from
Congress. Regulatees, consumer groups, courts, and even FCC employees
will likely react in different and perhaps unpredictable ways. I question
whether we can predict policy outcomes, particularly successful policy
outcomes, with any degree of certainty.
IV. EXPANDING THE CONTEXTUAL SETTING OF THE REFORM
DEBATE
In this Part of the Article, I intend to abandon my overly harsh
methodological critique of May's essay and instead champion his spirited
call for fresh thinking about "reforming the original experiment.' A4 But
instead of focusing on the FCC and its experience in 2003, I will head in
the opposite direction 5 and explore the FCC's regulatory environment in
the context of other structures that affect policy.
Before we consider structural reform of the FCC, we should first
critically examine the overall policy environment in which the agency
operates. Otherwise, we run the danger of wrongly viewing regulation as
merely an isolated, binary activity: the regulator acting on the regulatee.
What are the factors-political, social, economic, and legal-that unduly
constrain or overindulge the FCC? Perhaps, if reform is indeed required,
we should first examine what some have called the "'institutional
endowments' '46 that, at least in some cases, can be predictive of regulatory
43. Cynthia R. Farina, Undoing the New Deal Through the New Presidentialism, 22
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 227, 235 (1998).
44. May, supra note 2, at 1312.
45. May's essay considers structural reform of the FCC at the agency level. Heading in
a different direction, one could examine reform issues at a microlevel by reviewing the
FCC's procedures and practices, or at a macrolevel, as this Article briefly attempts, by
reviewing the regulatory and policy environment beyond the agency.
46. Brian Levy & Pablo T. Spiller, The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory
Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation, 10 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 201, 205 (1994). Levy and Spiller describe five endowments: (1) executive and
legislative institutions, (2) judicial institutions, (3) customs and broadly accepted norms that
constrain behavior, (4) the contending social interests within a society, and (5) the
administrative capabilities of the nation. Id. at 205-06. Levy and Spiller generally conclude
that those governance structures which constrain administrative discretion and induce
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success or failure. May mentions one and suggests others.4 7 Combined,
they raise the question of whether the FCC needs reform or whether we
should first rethink other aspects of the regulatory and policy environment.
Some elements of that larger environment include: previous FCC decisions,
international organizations, Congress, and federalism.
A. Previous FCC Decisions
There is, perhaps, no greater constraint on FCC behavior and action
than the agency's previous actions. We tend to think of the agency as an
undifferentiated whole, but the FCC is composed of serial mini-
administrations, each of which leave their stamp on media and
communications policy. Even setting aside legal obligations for the FCC to
follow precedent or explain its departures therefrom, 8 there exist practical
reasons why previous FCC decisions are so constraining. Take, for
example, the issue of standards setting. If the FCC sets a technological
standard for a consumer device and then millions of those devices are sold
in the marketplace, a subsequent mini-administration has little choice but to
accommodate that standard for a period of time. Thus, the FCC's previous
decisions have contributed to certain market structures that are difficult to
undo or substantially amend through simple administrative reform.
B. International Organizations
Media and communications are global businesses. Increasingly, we
are also seeing global regulatory structures, ranging from the trade-specific
World Trade Organization ("WTO") 4 9 to the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN").50 Increasingly, the FCC may
find itself unable to make policy in a particular area because that role has
been assigned to another, more internationally-focused entity. Similarly,
the FCC may be required to compromise its efforts in order to achieve
private investment produce the best outcomes. Id. at 202-03.
47. May, for example, acknowledges that the FCC is often faced with "ill-defined and
sometimes contradictory statutory mandates." May, supra note 2, at 1308. May also
describes numerous court battles faced by the FCC, highlighting the fact that the agency
does not always have the final say in policy matters. Id. at 1313.
48. See Greater Boston Tel. Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
49. The WTO is a multilateral trading system in which, for telecommunications
purposes, member states agree to certain enforceable commitments, typically related to
market access by foreign competitors. See World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org
(last visited Mar. 16, 2006).
50. ICANN says it is "responsible for coordinating the management of the technical
elements of the [Domain Name System] to ensure universal resolvability so that all users of
the Internet can find all valid addresses." ICANN Information, http://www.icann.org/
general/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2006).
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some form of regulatory coordination with an international organization.
This is an interesting area for those interested in reform, posing important
questions: Are global regulatory structures more effective in an
interconnected world? Do global regulatory structures impede the
effectiveness of the FCC?
C. Congress
The actions of Congress have an obvious effect on FCC performance.
Normative policy preferences, for the most part, are established by
Congress and merely implemented by the FCC. Similarly, the FCC's
statutory remit can be expanded or narrowed by Congress, as can particular
procedures 51 or legal standards or presumptions. 52 Particularly since the
1996- Act,53 Congress specifies not only the policy goal, but also
increasingly specifies the methods, timing, and legal standards by which
the FCC seeks that goal. 54 Perhaps one area of reform to explore would be
a loosening of these legislative constraints, applied in an ex ante fashion by
Congress and often without serious study. This is particularly true in
situations where-if you endorse May's viewpoint-we are experiencing a
period of rapid technological change.
Another useful area for reform to explore would be a complete rewrite
of the nation's laws pertaining to media and communications, particularly
in light of the recent developments associated with wireless and Internet
delivery of information. May's essay suggests that the laws which govern




States play a prominent role in both the media and communications
sectors. For example, often subject to broad federal guidelines, state and
local governments typically franchise cable operators and authorize
telecommunications providers, and they specify the terms and conditions
under which broadband and wireless facilities are emplaced. Perhaps
51. See 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2000) (requiring the FCC to act on certain "forbearance"
petitions within one year and ninety days of their submission).
52. See id. § 312(d) (putting the burden of proof in FCC license revocation proceedings
on the Commission).
53. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
54. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and
the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DuKE L.J. 819, 820 (1988) (describing the
congressional trend of narrowing administrative agency discretion).
55. May, supra note 2, at 1308 nn.3-4.
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curbing the power of state and local authorities to make or impede certain
media and communications policies would increase the effectiveness of the
FCC.
Based on the foregoing, even a brief exploration of the environment
in which the FCC operates reveals numerous areas where reform could
proceed ahead of, or in conjunction with, institutional agency reform. But a
review that solely focuses on the FCC, even if it is empirically rigorous,
will be incomplete and perhaps misguided if it is not situated in the wider
legal and policy context.
V. OFCOM ON THE POTOMAC
Our review of models for reform should also not be limited to the
United States. One useful model may be the United Kingdom's Office of
Communications ("Ofcom"), a regulator with which I have some
56familiarity. Ofcom was created on December 29, 2003, as a result of a
complete structural overhaul of how the United Kingdom regulates the
media and communications industries. 57 Ofcom replaced five other legacy
regulators that previously governed differing industry sectors. Ofcom is
therefore what some call a "converged regulator."
58
Here is the comparison point for May's call for reform: Ofcom is not
a collegiate policymaking body that functions in the same manner as the
FCC. Ofcom has a more corporate structure. Ofcom has two leaders, called
the "Chief Executive" and the "Chairman." 59 Ofcom is also not bipartisan
or multipartisan like the FCC. By contrast, the appointment of Ofcom's
Chief Executive is controlled by the government in power in the United
56. In 2003, I cofounded OfcomWatch, a Web site that monitors the regulatory
activities of Ofcom. As a comparatively new regulator, Ofcom is not well known within the
United States. Ofcomwatch Home Page, http://www.ofcomwatch.co.uk [hereinafter
Ofcom Watch].
57. See generally Ofcom Communications, About Ofcom, www.ofcom.org.uk/about
(last visited Mar. 18, 2006).
58. Ofcom was actually created by the Office of Communications Act of 2002 but was
provided with greater structural clarity, remit, and procedures at the end of 2003. See Office
of Communications Act 2002, ch. 11, http://www.opsi.gov.uklacts/acts2002/2002001 .htm
(last visited Mar. 18, 2006); Communications Act 2003, ch. 21, Pt. 1, http://www.opsi.
govuk/acts/acts2003/20030021.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2006).
59. Ofcom's nine-member board differs from the FCC's five-member board for several
reasons. First, the Ofcom board functions more like a corporate board and leaves the day-to-
day media and communications regulation to the Chief Executive. Further, Ofcom's board
adheres to a code of conduct in which all board members are deemed to have agreed to all
decisions, and dissenting viewpoints are not revealed, either internally or externally. Finally,
except for its current Chairperson, Lord Currie, the Ofcom board generally acts behind the
scenes and is not a focal point for policy matters. See Office of Communications, The
Ofcom Board: Functions and Role, http://www.ofcom.org.uklabout/csg/ofcom-board/
role/#acontent (last visited Mar. 18, 2006).
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Kingdom, currently Tony Blair's New Labour government. So, Ofcom
possesses the two structural characteristics-small leadership and part of
the political branch-advanced by May for possible reform of the FCC.
The similarities between Ofcom and the model of structural reform
May suggests for the FCC raise the questions: Is Ofcom more accountable,
quick-acting, and coherent than the FCC? Would structuring the FCC to
resemble Ofcom improve the U.S. media and communications regulatory
system? I will attempt a brief answer to these questions, mindful of the
dangers when comparing institutional structures across legal cultures. 60 I
will also temporarily discard the methodological rigor that I applied to
May's analysis of the FCC.
Because Ofcom was only created in December 2003, it is probably
too soon to remark on whether Ofcom is an optimal regulator from an
effectiveness standpoint. But in my opinion, by simply replacing five
legacy regulators and serving as a single source for media and
communications regulation, Ofcom represents a significant structural
improvement over the legacy regulators. By having one regulator instead of
five, citizens, consumers, and regulatees are probably more likely to know
where to turn for information.
With respect to accountability, Ofcom is very responsible to New
Labour and its key ministers who cover media and communications policy:
Prime Minister Tony Blair, and Secretary of State for Culture, Media and
Sport Tessa Jowell. The links between Number 10 Downing Street and
Ofcom are clear, and because there has never been a separation of powers
in the United Kingdom, no person seriously questions whether New Labour
directly controls media and communications policy. They do--despite
occasional disclaimers to the contrary.
62
60. See ROGER COTrERRELL, COMPARING LEGAL CuLTuREs 13 (David Nelken ed.,
1997) ("One of the enduring problems of comparative law has been its inability to
demonstrate convincingly the theoretical value of doctrinal comparisons separated from
comparative analysis of the entire political, economic and social (we might call it
contextual) matrix in which legal doctrine and procedures exist."). In other words, Ofcom is
part of a British policymaking establishment, aimed at British citizens and consumers, and
acting within the British (and larger European) business and intellectual climate. A simple
structural comparison to the FCC, while useful in some respects, ignores the many other
variables that may explain policy preferences and outcomes.
61. See 10 Downing Street, Her Majesty's Government, http://www.number-
10.gov.uk/output/ Pagel371.asp (specifying the United Kingdom cabinet ministers) (last
visited Mar. 18, 2006).
62. Interestingly, Ofcom's executive, Stephen Carter, recently claimed that his agency
is "unashamedly technocratic." Stephen Carter, Chief Executive Officer, Office of
Communications, Address to Incorporated Society of British Advertisers Annual
Conference: Ofcom Two Years On (Mar. 9, 2005), http://www.ofcom.org.uk/mediaI
speeches/2005/03/isba#content.
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But I have criticized Ofcom for a lack of accountability and
transparency to the public and regulatees on numerous occasions. Ofcom' s
Web site is often confusing to the casual visitor.63 Ofcom has no codified
set of regulations. Ofcom has no rules governing ex parte presentations
about contested or controversial matters. Ofcom does not permit reply
comments in policy-making proceedings. Ofcom is overly secretive with
respect to its documents, even in the face of the United Kingdom's
Freedom of Information Act,64 which was implemented in January 2005.65
Ofcom regularly holds meetings with so-called stakeholders and does not
invite or otherwise inform the public. Finally, Ofcom appears to "sell"
already formulated policy answers to the public and regulatees, rather than
consult in a meaningful way.
66
Does Ofcom act in a timely manner? Because Ofcom is a new
regulator, it may be much too soon to consider this question. I will offer
one example, however, because it is the United Kingdom's comparison
proceeding to the FCC's media ownership review. This is Ofcom's
strategic review of PSB. Ofcom's PSB review was initiated on November
6, 2003, 68 partially completed on February 8, 2005, with the release of
Ofcom's Phase 3 report, and will continue into summer or autumn 2005 as
the regulator continues to consult on matters related to the United
Kingdom's distinct nations and regions. 69 The PSB review was initially
supposed to be a twelve-month review, so it appears that Ofcom acted in an
untimely manner. In terms of comparing the timeliness of Ofcom as a
63. Posting of Russ Taylor to http://www.ofcomwatch.co.uk/2005/03/ofcom-v-fsa-on-
complaints (Mar. 29, 2005, 22:09 GMT) [hereinafter Posting 1].
64. Posting of Russ Taylor to http://www.ofcomwatch.co.uk/2005/09/ofcom-should-
publish-its-foi-decisions (Sept. 7, 2005, 12:13 GMT).
65. Posting of Russ Taylor to http://www.ofcomwatch.co.uk/2006/01/ofcom-2005-year-
in-review (Jan. 1, 2006, 17:02 GMT).
66. OfcomWatch, supra note 56; see also Posting 1, supra note 63.
67. The public service broadcasting ("PSB") review has three phases and attempts to
answer some of the same basic questions as the FCC's media ownership proceeding. For
example, it attempts to answer what marketplace solutions and governmental regulations
will work together to best deliver quality media to citizens and consumers. The PSB review
feeds into the United Kingdom government's 2006 review of the BBC Charter, a process
that commenced in December 2003 and will not conclude until mid-2006. See U.K.
Department of Culture, Media and Sport, BBC Charter Review Timetable,
http://www.bbccharterreview.org.uk/home/timetable.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2006).
68. See Press Release, Office of Communications, Ofcom Commences Full Review of
U.K. Public Service Broadcasting (Nov. 11, 2003), http://www.ofcom.org.uk/media/news/
2003/1 1/nr_20031106 (last visited Sept. 18, 2005).
69. See OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS, OFCOM REVIEW OF PUBLIC SERVICE TELEVISION
BROADCASTING, PHASE 3 - COMPETITION FOR QUALITY 2 (Feb. 8, 2005), available at
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consultlcondocslpsb3/psb3.pdf.
70. See Office of Communications, supra note 59.
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regulator controlled by New Labour with one manager with the timeliness
of the FCC as an independent agency with five commissioners, the PSB
review only tells a small story, but it nevertheless probably stands for the
proposition that, when you ask or raise important questions of public
policy, resolution of those issues will take time. The particular structure of
the agency may only be a small factor in determining the timing of policy
measures.
We will know much more about Ofcom and its effectiveness in the
coming years. Some of that knowledge may address the issues raised in
May's essay-what are the connections, if any, between agency structure
and successful policy outcomes? I suspect the answer will never be clear.
The policymaking environment contains too many variables, both known
and unknown (e.g., technological advancements), to enable us to fashion "a
model agency for the digital age." 7 1 Regulators-no matter what their
structure-will likely continue to disappoint their critics.
VI. CONCLUSION
May hits the right tone in his essay. We should consider reform of the
FCC, and reform of all institutional structures that govern the media and
communications sector. Consideration of reform, however, cannot proceed
unless we first come to a consensus, based partly on empirical evidence,
that reform is needed and that the FCC is the entity to which reforms
should be targeted. Similarly, efforts to reform the FCC will be fruitless if
they are not part of a comprehensive reform strategy that considers the
wider legal and policy environment in which the FCC operates.
71. May, supra note 2, at 1325 (quoting former FCC Chairman William Kennard).
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